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equilibrium with funding competition and restricted participation yields the highest level of 
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Higher education ﬁnancing faces two main problems which may lead to underinvest-
ment in skilled human capital formation. The ﬁrst problem is due to the peculiarities
of human capital which prevent this form of capital from being used as loan colla-
teral. As a consequence, banks are reluctant to provide higher education loans (see,
e.g., Galor and Zeira, 1993). The second problem is caused by imperfections in the
market for risk bearing. Investment in higher education is risky because students
are at least partially ignorant about their abilities and, hence, about the returns on
their investments. Yet, ﬁnancial markets are unlikely to provide adequate pooling
or diversiﬁcation of these risks due to the existence of moral hazard incentives in an
agent’s acquisition of human capital and in his performance in the labor market.
As a possible response to these market failures the creation of income-contingent
loan-repayment programs has been suggested (Friedman, 1962; Nerlove, 1975; Chap-
man, 2006). Income-contingent loans have the special characteristic that the terms
of repayment depend on the borrowers’ future incomes: individuals with higher
incomes have higher repayment obligations. Such loan contracts not only allow stu-
dents to pool (part of) their future income risks but can also be used to transfer
risks on investment in human capital from borrowers and lenders to third parties.
Such student loans arrangements exist in Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Sweden,
the UK, and few other countries. Yet, while income-contingent loans may ease
credit constraints and improve the risk allocation, they also imply signiﬁcant cross-
subsidization between subgroups of students with diﬀerent future income prospects
which may lead to excessive investment in higher education. In fact, students with
poor income prospects are more likely to take out education loans under such a
scheme than students with good income prospects and, hence, the human capital
formation process is characterized by both adverse selection and overinvestment in
education (Eckwert and Zilcha, 2011).
The observation that a ﬁnancing regime consisting of competitive credit markets
tends to produce underinvestment in higher education, while an income-contingent
loans-repayment program tends to produce overinvestment, suggests that perhaps
a market structure in which both schemes coexist might produce the eﬃcient level
of aggregate investment in human capital formation. Moreover, since the market
1structure with funding competition oﬀers students more options in ﬁnancing their
educational investments, economic welfare may also be higher.
Our paper concentrates upon the implications of funding competition between
credit markets and income-contingent education loans regarding human capital for-
mation and economic welfare. We set up a theoretical framework in which indivi-
duals live for two periods. In the ‘youth’ period, agents obtain education and in the
‘working’ period they generate incomes based on their human capital and skills. At
birth, each individual is randomly endowed with some innate ability which beco-
mes fully known only in the working period. Following compulsory schooling in the
ﬁrst part of the youth period, each individual receives a (publicly observed) signal
which is correlated to his/her true innate ability. To simplify our analysis we take
all agents to be ex ante identical. In particular, we ignore family background when
decisions about higher education are made. The decision whether to acquire higher
education following the compulsory schooling will be based on the ﬁnancing options
available to the agent and on the information conveyed by the signal. Agents with
diﬀerent signals diﬀer in their posterior distributions of ability and, hence, they
have diﬀerent income prospects.
We consider three ﬁnancing regimes. Under the ﬁrst regime, the government gua-
rantees access to credit markets for all students who attend higher education. Under
the second regime, a Student Loans Institution (SLI) oﬀers income-contingent loan
contracts to all individuals who are willing to invest in higher education. And under
the third regime, which is the main focus of our study, income-contingent education
ﬁnance coexists with competitive credit markets. We ﬁnd that credit market fun-
ding leads to underinvestment in higher education while income-contingent loans
funding leads to overinvestment. Funding competition does not remedy this misal-
location of educational investment: we ﬁnd that under the third regime aggregate
investment in higher education is suboptimally high; and the pool of students who
participate in the income-contingent loans program is adversely selected which leads
to more income inequality and less social welfare.
In the absence of government intervention, funding competition in higher edu-
cation is plagued by adverse selection in two respects. First, the cross-subsidization
within the income-contingent loans program entices students with negative expected
2net returns on their investments to participate in the program. This misallocation
of educational investment raises the ﬁnancing costs for all participants, because the
program is not subsidized by the government and, hence, must break even in equi-
librium. Second, the elevated ﬁnancing costs within the program provide incentives
for students with good income prospects to shun the program and turn to the credit
market for funding. This eﬀect pushes the ﬁnancing costs within the program even
higher. Thus, in equilibrium, individuals with poor income prospects tend to pay
higher ﬁnancing costs. As a consequence, income inequality rises and social welfare
declines.
The fact that funding competition alone does not remedy the misallocation of
educational investment suggests a role for government policy, which would restrict
access to higher education to individuals with non-negative expected net returns on
their investments. We ﬁnd that such policy, if combined with funding competition
in higher education, is quite appropriate as it restores eﬃciency of the educational
investment process and, at the same time, mitigates the adverse selection problem
within the income-contingent loans program. In particular, under a policy of re-
stricted access, funding competition leads to higher social welfare compared to pure
credit market funding. Since a regulation which excludes credit markets from higher
education ﬁnance is not a feasible policy option, we conclude that funding competiti-
on in combination with access restrictions constitute the best regulatory framework
for the higher education sector.
2 The Model
We consider a two-period model with a single commodity (capital good) and a
continuum of individuals, say, in the interval [0,1]. In the latter part of the ﬁrst
period, following compulsary education, an individual may take out a loan and make
a capital investment in higher education in order to acquire additional skills. Thus,
the capital investment increases the agent’s human capital in the second period
when the agent works and earns labor income. Labor income depends on each
agent’s skills or human capital, which is assumed to be observable. In the second
period, each individual consumes his net wealth which is the diﬀerence between his
3labor income and the repayment obligation of the loan.
Diversity within the population is generated by random innate ability, which
aﬀects an agent’s productivity level. Abilities are assigned to individuals by nature
at birth. i.e., at the outset of the ﬁrst period. At this time, however, individual ability
is not observable, and is not even known to the agent himself. Human capital of
individual i depends on his random innate ability ai and on his private investment
in higher education, xi. The investment decision is made at date 0 while random
innate ability realizes at date 1.
In order to keep the analytical setup simple, we assume that following his basic
education the agent faces a binary investment choice: he may either invest one
unit of capital in education, or he may not invest at all. If the individual does not
invest, xi = 0, he remains unskilled and attains a basic human capital level A > 0 in
period 1. If the agent invests, xi = 1, then he becomes a skilled worker. In that case,
his human capital in period 2 is A + ˜ ai, where ability ˜ ai represents the additonal
productivity due to higher education. The random variable ˜ ai assumes values in
some interval A := [a1,a2] ⊂ R++.
We denote by  (a) the density of agents with ability a and adopt the normali-
zation
 
A  (a)da = 1. From the perspective of an individual in period 0, ability is
random as it is the realization of a random variable ˜ a with expectation ¯ a := E˜ a and
distribution  (·). Yet, there is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy, i.e., the
ex post distribution of abilities across the population is exactly   . Our modeling
approach follows the technique suggested in Feldman and Gilles (1985, Proposition
2), where uncertainty exists at the individual level but in the aggregate there is no
uncertainty.
Each agent receives a publicly observable signal y ∈ Y := [y
¯
, ¯ y] ⊂ R of his
ability, a, before he makes the investment decision. The signal might be interpre-
ted as a noisy test result which is correlated with the agent’s ability.1 Real world
examples include high school grades and the matriculation examinations used in
1We assume that signals and abilities satisfy the strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
(MLRP), i.e., the signals are ordered in such a way that y′ > y implies that the posterior distri-
bution of ability conditional on y′ dominates the posterior distribution of ability conditional on y
in the ﬁrst-degree stochastic dominance (see Milgrom, 1981).
4many countries. Since the tests are noisy, individuals with the same ability, a, ty-
pically receive diﬀerent signals. We denote by νa(y) the density according to which
signals are distributed across agents with ability a. Each individual uses the si-
gnal as a screening device and forms expectations about his unknown ability in a
Bayesian way. The signals are distributed across the entire population according to
ν(y) =
 
A νa(y) (a)da. If ˜ ay denotes random ability conditional on the signal y,
then average ability of all agents in the signal group y is ¯ ay := E[˜ ay].
The human capital of agent i who has received signal yi, will be2
˜ hyi =
 
A; ; if xi = 0
A + ˜ ayi ; if xi = 1
. (1)
Production is carried out by competitive ﬁrms in period 2 according to a constant
returns to scale production technology which uses physical capital, K, and human
capital, H, as factors of production. Each individual i inelastically supplies l units
of labor. The agent’s supply of eﬀective labor units is given by lhi. His labor income
in period 2 is wlhi, where w denotes the wage rate (price of one eﬃciency unit of
labor). To ease notation we adopt the normalization l = 1.
Assumption 1 The aggregate production function F(K,H) is concave, homoge-
neous of degree 1, and satisﬁes FK > 0, FH > 0, FKK < 0, FHH < 0.
Our economy represents a small country in a world where physical capital is
internationally mobile while human capital is immobile. By and large, this speci-
ﬁcation is in line with the empirial observation that the globalization process has
promoted international mobility of physical capital far more than international mo-
bility of labor. International capital mobility in combination with the small country
assumption implies that the interest rate, r, is exogenously given. Physical capital
fully depreciates in the production process. Hence, marginal productivity of aggre-
gate physical capital equals R := 1+r. Given the aggregate stock of human capital,
H, the stock of physical capital K adjusts such that
FK(K,H) = R (2)
2Later we shall extend our analysis to the case where A depends on the average human capital
of the older generation, following the type of assumptions used by Lucas (1988).
5is satisﬁed. Equation (2) in combination with Assumption 1 implies that K/H
is determined by the gross international rate of interest R. The wage rate which
equals the marginal product of eﬀective labor, w = FL(K/H,1), is also determined
once R is given. Throughout the paper we assume ¯ a > R/w, so that investment in
education is proﬁtable for an individual with average ability.
2.1 Funding Structure and Individual Behavior
All individuals are risk-averse expected utility maximizers with vNM-utility func-
tion u(˜ c), where ˜ c denotes random second period consumption.
Assumption 2 The utility function u : R+ → R is twice diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing and concave, and exhibits relative risk aversion less than or equal to 1,
i.e., −u′′(c)c/u′(c) ≤ 1, ∀c > 0.
Consumption is the diﬀerence between the agent’s labor income and the repayment
obligation of his loan. Below we will analyze three diﬀerent market structures for
ﬁnancing loans: competitive credit market, income-contingent loans market, and
a structure with coexistence of competitive credit market and income-contingent
loans market. The third structure, which gives individuals a choice between two
funding schemes, is the main focus of our analysis.
The equilibria under the various market structures will be evaluated and com-
pared with regard to their social welfare implications. The social planner’s welfare
index, W, evaluates the distribution of average incomes across the signal groups,
W =




where v : R+ → R is a strictly increasing and concave function, ¯ cy := E[˜ c|y],
and (˜ c|y) represents random consumption of an individual with signal y.3 Ceteris
paribus, higher average consumption in a signal group raises the index; and higher
consumption (= income) dispersion across signal groups decreases the index due to
3In our model, all individuals are identical ex ante. Therefore, in equilibrium, agents with the
same signal choose identical consumption proﬁles.
6the concavity of v. The concavity of v thus reﬂects the inequality aversion of the
social planner.
The social welfare criterion uses only observable data, namely average incomes
in the various signal groups. These data are available to the government and can
thus be used for evaluating policy choices. Therefore our comparison of funding
schemes and policy options will be based on the social welfare criterion (3).
2.1.1 Credit Market
Under this funding structure the government guarantees access to credit markets for
all students who attend higher education. Suppose agent i considers to ﬁnance his
investment via the credit market at the going interest rate r, where R = 1+r > 0.





wA + w˜ ayi − R] > u(wA). (4)
Otherwise he chooses xi = 0. Due to MLRP (cf. footnote 1) the LHS in (4) is
strictly monotone increasing in the signal yi. Hence there exists a unique cutoﬀ
signal ˆ y such that all individuals with signals larger than or equal to ˆ y invest in
higher education, and individuals with signals lower than ˆ y do not invest.
The aggregate stock of human capital can then be represented as
H = A +
  ¯ y
ˆ y
¯ ayν(y)dy . (5)
In equilibrium, each agent chooses investment in education according to (4), factor
markets clear, and aggregate human capital follows the accumulation equation (5).
Deﬁnition 1 Given the international gross interest rate R = 1+r, an equilibrium
with credit funding (CME) consists of a vector (ˆ y,w,K,H) ∈ R4
+, ˆ y ∈ [y
¯
, ¯ y], such
that
(i) the cutoﬀ signal, ˆ y, satisﬁes (4) with equality,
(ii) the aggregate stock of human capital, H, satisﬁes (5),
(iii) the wage and physical capital satisfy w = FL(K/H,1) and R = FK(K/H,1).
7A CME always exists and it is unique: for given R > 0, the second equality in
(iii) uniquely determines K/H. For given K/H, the ﬁrst equality in (iii) uniquely
determines the wage rate w. (4) then yields the cutoﬀ signal ˆ y which is independent
of H. Finally, aggregate human capital, H, is determined by eq. (5).
In a CME, the economy-wide aggregate investment in education is suboptimally
low. To illustrate this fact, we calculate the eﬃcient cutoﬀ signal, ye, which maxi-
mizes social welfare. In the social welfare optimum, ye separates agents who invest








  ¯ y
y





′(ye) = ν(ye)[v(wA) − v(wA + w¯ aye − R)] ⇐⇒ ¯ aye = R/w. (6)
According to (6), in a social optimum investment in education is eﬃcient in the
sense that only those signal groups invest in higher education, for which the expected
return, w¯ ay, exceeds the funding cost R. This investment rule implies that aggregate
consumption is maximized.
From E[wA + w˜ aye − R] = wA we conclude
E[u(wA + w˜ aye − R)] < u(wA) (7)
due to risk aversion. Combining (4) and (7) yields ˆ y > ye, i.e., the cutoﬀ signal
beyond which agents invest in higher education in a CME is suboptimally high
and, hence, investment is suboptimally low.
Proposition 1 In the CME, aggregate investment in education is suboptimally low.
2.1.2 Income-Contingent Loans Equilibrium (ICLE)
The ineﬃciency of educational investment under the credit market regime is due
to the fact that the credit market does not allow individuals to share idiosyncratic
ability (hence income) risks. To mitigate the problem of underinvestment, the pro-
vision of income-contingent education loans through some government agency or
8private lending institution has been proposed (Friedman, 1962; Chapman, 2006). If
properly designed, such loan contracts have the potential to improve risk sharing
and reduce underinvestment in the higher education sector (Eckwert and Zilcha,
2010).
Assume that a ﬁnancial institution (Student Loans Institution, or SLI) oﬀers
income-contingent loan contracts to all individuals who are willing to invest in
higher education. The payback obligation of a loan is linked to an individual’s fu-
ture (gross) income: agents with higher incomes (i.e. higher abilities) have higher
payback obligations. Clearly, such loan contracts provide insurance against uncer-
tain income prospects that are due to random ability realizations. We consider an
income-contingent loans (ICL) program that includes all individuals and requires
no subsidization from the government. For now, by assumption, the regular credit
market cannot be used for funding educational expenditures.4
If agent i decides to invest in higher education, he receives a loan of 1 unit in
period 0 with repayment obligation Rai/¯ a in period 1.5 The net income from this









Note that agent i’s expected payback, R¯ ayi/¯ a, is increasing in the signal, i.e., the
scheme ‘penalizes’ agents with high signals.
The ICL-program takes no account of the heterogeneity in ability prospects
that is already revealed through the individual signals when investment and borro-
wing decisions are made. Thus the ICL-program does not just provide insurance,
but rather it combines insurance against the unrealized part of ability with cross-
subsidization between classes of people in diﬀerent signal groups. Observe that the
SLI makes no proﬁts. It just breaks even as it provides loans that, from an ex ante
4This assumption may appear unrealistic as it requires a regulatory regime under which ICLs
are mandatory and, hence, credit markets are excluded from higher education ﬁnance. In fact, our
study considers the ICL-equilibrium mainly as a benchmark for comparison rather than a viable
regime for higher education ﬁnance. However, in some countries (e.g., Australia) at least part of
the tuition fees are collected through mandatory ICLs (Chapman, 2006).
5This type of student loan market was studied recently in Eckwert and Zilcha (2011). Such
student loan markets exist in Australia, Sweden, the UK and Chile, for example (for more details
see Barr and Crawford, 1998; Lleras, 2004).
9perspective, share income risks on fair terms across the entire population.
In view of (8), all agents invest in higher education since ¯ a > R/w has been
assumed. We conclude that in an equilibrium6 with ICL-funding (ICLE, for short)
the economy-wide aggregate investment in education and, hence, human capital
formation, is suboptimally high, because individuals with signals below ye choose
to invest.
2.1.3 Funding Competition Equilibrium (FCE)
We have seen above that credit funding leads to underinvestment in higher educa-
tion while ICL-funding leads to overinvestment. In this section we analyze whether
income-contingent education ﬁnance can coexist with competitive credit markets in
the absence of government regulation and, if so, how competition between the two
ﬁnancing schemes aﬀects the eﬃciency properties of the investment allocation in
the higher education sector. Suppose that each individual has the option, but not
the obligation, to participate in an ICL-program. Within this program, the terms
of repayment of an education loan depend on the individual’s signal and, hence, on
his income in the working period. Let
¯ a(y
′) := E[¯ a˜ y|y
¯
≤ ˜ y ≤ y
′] (9)
denote average ability of agents in the signal groups between y
¯
and y′. Consider
the following arrangement: if all individuals with signals less than or equal to y′
participate in the ICL-program and all other individuals do not participate, then
the repayment obligation (for borrowing one unit of capital to ﬁnance education)
of each participant i is Rai/¯ a(y′).
Note that the ICL-program just breaks even. Also note that within this program
risks are shared (in an ex ante sense) across signal groups: individuals with high
signals ‘subsidize’ those with low signals.








6The equilibrium is deﬁned in analogy to Deﬁnition 1.
10for all agents in signal group y. Thus, if the net return in (10) is positive for some
signal group y then it is positive for all signal groups. Therefore, if the ICL-program
does not break down in equilibrium, i.e., if it attracts at least one customer, then
all individuals invest in higher education. Some of these individuals, however, may
ﬁnd it optimal to ﬁnance their investments via the credit market.
We now investigate which signal groups participate in the ICL-program and
which ones choose the credit market. Let
˜ c1(y) = Aw + ˜ ayw − R (11)
and
˜ c2(y;y







where (11) describes random consumption of an agent with signal y if he invests via
the credit market; and (12) describes random consumption under the ICL-program.
Denote by
V1(y) = Eu(˜ c1(y)); V2(y;y
′) = Eu(˜ c2(y,y
′))
the corresponding expected utilities.








is strictly increasing in y.
Proof: See Appendix.
Equation (13) implies that individuals in signal group y∗ are indiﬀerent between
investing via the ICL-program and investing via the credit market, if all agents in
the signal groups y ≤ y∗ participate in the ICL-program. From Lemma 1 it follows
immediately that all agents with signals greater than y∗ ﬁnance their investments
via the credit market and all agents with signals smaller than y∗ participate in the
ICL-program.
11Deﬁnition 2 Given the international gross interest rate R = 1+r, an equilibrium




, ¯ y], such that
(i) the cutoﬀ signal, y∗, satisﬁes u(Aw) ≤ V2(y∗,y∗) = V1(y∗),7
(ii) the aggregate stock of human capital satisﬁes H = A + E˜ a,
(iii) the wage and physical capital satisfy w = FL(K/H,1) and R = FK(K/H,1).
In (i), the inequality ensures that the ICL-program does not break down, and
the equality implies that the credit market co-exists alongside the ICL-program.
Note that, given (12), the inequality u(Aw) ≤ V2(y∗,y∗) implies w¯ a(y∗) ≥ R, i.e.,
on average investment in education within the ICL-program is proﬁtable. Moreover,
the last inequality in combination with (3) and (13) implies y∗ > ˆ y. Thus, in the
FCE fewer individuals use the credit market than in the CME. The equality in (ii)
holds because in this equilibrium all individuals invest in higher education. In fact,
according to Lemma 1, all agents with signals lower than y∗ join the ICL-program,
and all other agents ﬁnance their educational investments via the credit market.
If the agents are risk-neutral, then the equality in (i) of Deﬁnition 2 is only
satisﬁed for y∗ = y
¯
. In that case, no FC-equilibrium exists, because y
¯
< ye has
been assumed. Thus, a suﬃcient amount of risk aversion is necessary for this type
of equilibrium to exist.8
In an FCE, all individuals are (weakly) better oﬀ at the interim stage, i.e.,
after they have received their signals, than in an equilibrium with credit funding.
This follows from the observation that expected utility of individuals with signals
y ≥ y∗ stays the same, and expected utility of all other agents increases because
7y∗ := ¯ y, if V2(y,y) > V1(y) for all y.
8Let y′ be deﬁned by ¯ a(y′)w = R which implies y′ > ye. Then a risk sharing equilibrium exists
if, as a suﬃcient condition, individual preferences satisfy the inequalities
u(Aw) < Eu(Aw + w˜ ay′ − R)
Eu(Aw + w˜ a¯ y − (˜ a¯ y/¯ a)R) > Eu(Aw + w˜ a¯ y − R).
12they voluntarily choose to participate in the ICL-program rather than using the
credit market.
Nevertheless, even though competition between the ﬁnancing schemes has some
merits, the FC-equilibrium is still ineﬃcient.9 Ineﬃciencies are caused by two fac-
tors. The ﬁrst factor consists of an externality, which is caused by the competition
between the schemes. The externality is imposed on individuals who participate in
the ICL-program: the more agents go to the credit market, the less favorable are
the terms of repayment for agents participating in the ICL-program. Due to this
externality, the cutoﬀ signal y∗ is suboptimally low, i.e., it lies below the socially
optimal level.
Proposition 2 In the FCE, the cutoﬀ signal, y∗, which separates the signal groups





According to Proposition 2, the externality from funding competition could be
mitigated and social welfare could be raised if some individuals who ﬁnance their
investment through the credit market would join the ICL-program. Yet, in the
absence of government intervention these individuals have no incentive to change
their ﬁnancing decisions.
Second, in an FC-equilibrium individuals with very low signals y < ye invest in
higher education because they are subsidized by other agents in the ICL-program.
Investments of these individuals are ineﬃcient for the economy as a whole because,
on average, the returns to these investments fall short of the investment costs; i.e.,
w¯ ay < R for y < ye.
Proposition 3 In the FCE, aggregate investment in education is suboptimally high.
9In particular, the FCE does not dominate the equilibrium with ICL-funding in the Pareto
sense. Under funding competition, the ICL-program becomes adversely selected, i.e. ¯ a(y∗) < ¯ a,
which worsens the terms of borrowing for those individuals who participate in the ICL-program.
133 Funding Structure and Social Welfare
Under all funding structures considered so far the investment allocation process
is ineﬃcient: in the CME, aggregate investment is suboptimally low while ICLE
and FCE both lead to aggregate overinvestment. Moreover, the various funding
structures lead to diﬀerent degrees of income inequality across the signal groups.
Both income inequality as well as ineﬃciencies in the investment process have a
negative impact on social welfare. In this section we focus on the combined impact
of these two sources of welfare losses, i.e., we investigate how the funding structures
compare from the perspective of social welfare.
Even though funding competition gives individuals more ﬁnancial ﬂexibility than
ICL-funding, the latter funding structure leads to higher social welfare.
Proposition 4 Social welfare is higher in the ICLE than in the FCE.
Proof: see appendix.
The ICLE and the FCE both exhibit the same degree of investment ineﬃciency:
individuals in signal groups lower than ye invest in higher education even though
in these signal groups the funding cost exceeds the average return to investment.
Yet, the FCE has a more unequal income distribution than the ICLE, because the
pool of agents who participate in the ICL-program is adversely selected: individuals
with high signals and, hence, excellent income prospects don’t join the program
thereby worsening the terms of loan repayment for agents with lower signals who
participate in the program. This mechanism reduces social welfare as it increases
the spread between incomes in high signal groups and incomes in low signal groups.
Proposition 5 Suppose
w¯ a − R ≥
  ¯ y
ˆ y
(w¯ ay − R)ν(y)dy, (15)
i.e., the aggregate net return to investment in education is higher in the FCE than
in the CME. Then social welfare is higher in the FCE than in the CME.
Proof: see appendix.
14The investment ineﬃciency in the FCE (agents with signals less than ye inves-
ting in higher education) and, hence, the term on the LHS in (15) is independent
of posterior ability risks and of the individuals’ attitudes towards those risks. The
investment ineﬃciency in the CME, by contrast, results from individuals with si-
gnals higher than ye but lower than ˆ y who refuse to invest in higher education
because they shy away from the involved risk. This eﬀect is strengthened by both
higher posterior ability risk and higher individual risk aversion. The investment in-
eﬃciency in the CME therefore increases and, hence, the term on the RHS in (15)
declines with higher posterior ability risk and/or higher individual risk aversion.
Thus, Proposition 5 suggests that social welfare is higher in the FCE than in the
CME if either individuals are strongly risk-averse or if the screening information is
vague such that the posterior ability risks remain high.
Suppose, for instance, that individual preferences exhibit constant absolute risk
aversion, α > 0, and that the posterior distribution of abilities takes the form
˜ ay = ¯ ay + ˜ ǫ, where ˜ ǫ is Normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. Here
σ2 measures the posterior ability risk as well as the vagueness, or noisiness, of the
screening information. In that case ¯ aˆ y = 1
2wασ2 + R
w. Thus, if ασ2 → 2
w2(w¯ a¯ y − R)
then ˆ y → ¯ y such that the inequality in (15) is satisﬁed if the product of risk aversion
and posterior ability risk is suﬃciently high.
Propositions 4 and 5 together imply that under condition (15) the ICLE domi-
nates the CME in terms of social welfare:
Corollary 1 Suppose condition (15) is satisﬁed. Then social welfare is higher in
the ICLE than in the CME.
4 Access Restriction to Higher Education
In equilibria with ICL-funding, i.e., in ICLE and FCE, the economy-wide aggrega-
te investment in education is suboptimally high. This overinvestment worsens the
terms of loan repayment for individuals who participate in the ICL-program. In the
FCE, this problem is intensiﬁed as individuals in the highest signal groups turn to
the credit market for funding which further reduces the attractiveness of the ICL-
program. These sources of ineﬃciency can possibly be mitigated by a government
15policy which restricts access to higher education to individuals with signals higher
than the eﬃcient threshold level ye. We now investigate how the equilibria under
the various funding schemes compare with regard to social welfare, if such access
restriction to higher education is implemented.
4.1 Restricted Participation ICLE (RP/ICLE)
Suppose that the ICL-program is the only accessible means of higher education
ﬁnance and that the government restricts access to higher education to agents with
signals higher than the eﬃcient threshold level ye. Let
ˇ a(ye) := E[¯ a˜ y|ye ≤ ˜ y ≤ ¯ y] (16)
denote average ability of agents in signal groups higher than ye. Under restricted
access, the loan repayment obligation of each agent i who participates in the ICL-
program is Rai/ˇ a(ye). The ICL-program just breaks even because all individuals
with signals larger than ye participate in the program. In such restricted partici-
pation ICLE10 (RP/ICLE, for short) individuals with signals higher than ye are
better-oﬀ than in the ICLE because ˇ a(ye) > ¯ a and, hence, their terms of loan re-
payment have improved; and individuals with signals lower than ye are worse-oﬀ as
they are denied access to the higher education system.
4.2 Restricted Participation FCE (RP/FCE)
Suppose the government restricts access to higher education under a system of
funding competition where individuals can choose between participating in the ICL-
program and using the credit market. Such restriction not only prevents agents
with poor ability prospects from investing, but also makes the pool of agents who
participate in the ICL-program less adversely selected. As a consequence, the ICL-
program might become more attractive to individuals with higher signals thereby
raising the cutoﬀ signal y∗ and mitigating the externality from the competition
between the two funding schemes. More formally, deﬁne
˜ c2(y;ye,y







′) := E[¯ a˜ y|ye ≤ ˜ y ≤ y
′]. (17)
10The equilibrium is deﬁned in analogy to Deﬁnition 1.
16˜ c2(y;ye,y′) represents consumption of an individual with signal y who participates
in the ICL-program, if the ICL-program attracts all individuals with signals in
[ye,y′]. Note that ˜ c2(y;ye,y′) > Aw for all y′ > ye.
Deﬁnition 3 Given the international gross interest rate R = 1 + r and the gover-
nment threshold policy ye, a restricted participation equilibrium with funding com-
petition (RP/FC-equilibrium, for short) consists of a vector (y†,w,K,H) ∈ R4
+,
y† ∈ [ye, ¯ y], such that
(i) the cutoﬀ signal, y†, satisﬁes Eu(˜ c2(y†;ye,y†)) = V1(y†),11
(ii) the aggregate stock of human capital satisﬁes H = A +
  ¯ y
ye ¯ ayν(y)dy,
(iii) the wage and physical capital satisfy w = FL(K/H,1) and R = FK(K/H,1).
In an RP/FC-equilibrium with government policy ye, only individuals with si-
gnals larger than ye (are allowed to) invest in higher education, hence aggregate
consumption is maximized. An agent with signal y participates in the ICL-program
if y ∈ [ye,y†], and he uses the credit market if y > y†.
Observe that y† is strictly larger than ye, because Eu(˜ c2(ye,ye,ye)) > Eu(˜ c1(ye)) =
V1(ye). The inequality holds because ˜ c1(ye) is a mean preserving spread of ˜ c2(ye,ye,ye).12
Thus, unlike FC-equilibria, RP/FC-equilibria with operative ICL-programs always
exist. Moreover, (17) implies that ˜ c2(y†;ye,y†) > Aw, from which we conclude that
y† > ˆ y.
In the RP/FC-equilibrium, all individuals are (weakly) better oﬀ at the interim
stage, i.e., after they have received their signals, than in the equilibrium with credit
funding: expected utility of individuals with signals y < ye or y ≥ y† is the same in
both equilibria; and expected utility of individuals with signals between ye and y†
is (weakly) higher in the RP/FC-equilibrium because the agents voluntarily invest
and voluntarily participate in the ICLP.
11y† := ¯ y, if Eu(˜ c2(y;ye,y)) > V1(y) for all y ∈ [ye, ¯ y].
12Note that ˜ c1(ye) and ˜ c2(ye,ye,ye) have the same mean and that ˜ c2(ye,ye,ye)
(<)




174.3 Restricted Participation and Social Welfare
We now compare the RP/ICL-equilibrium and the RP/FC-equilibrium with respect
to the social welfare criterion (3). In both equilibria, agents with signals larger than
ye invest in higher education. In the RP/ICLE, all investments are ﬁnanced via
the ICL-program, while in the RP/FCE, individual investments are partly ﬁnanced
via the ICL-program and partly via the credit market. Since the allocation of in-
vestments is the same in both equilibria, aggregate consumption is also the same,
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Aw + ¯ ayw − R ; if y > y†
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≤ ˇ a(ye). (20)
(18) and (20) imply that ¯ c
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The RP/ICLE therefore dominates the RP/FCE in welfare terms.
Proposition 6 Social welfare is higher in the RP/ICLE than in the RP/FCE.
18The welfare comparison in Proposition 5 between the FCE and the CME was
ambiguous because both equilibria entail diﬀerent forms of investment ineﬃciency:
the FCE leads to overinvestment while the CME leads to underinvestment in higher
education. As a consequence, the aggregate net return to educational investment in
the FCE can be higher or lower than in the CME. Yet, if the government restricts
access to higher education, investment eﬃciency is restored under funding compe-
tition and, hence, the RP/FCE dominates the CME in terms of social welfare.13
Proposition 7 Social welfare is higher in the RP/FCE than in the CME.
Proof: see appendix.
Propositions 6 and 7 together imply
Corollary 2 Social welfare in higher in the RP/ICLE than in the CME.
Table 1 summarizes the results of our social welfare comparison across the va-
rious funding structures. If access to higher education is not restricted, and if the
initial funding structure in the higher education sector consists solely of a compe-
titive credit market, then the creation of an ICL-program which competes against
credit market funding may enhance economic welfare (if condition (15) is satis-
ﬁed). Yet, if the initial funding structure consists solely of an ICL-program, then
economic welfare declines if students are given access to a credit market which
competes against the ICL-program. Such competition leads to an adversely selec-
ted ICL-program from which the welfare losses arise. A policy which restricts access
to higher education to signal groups with positive net returns on educational invest-
ment eliminates overinvestment under ICL-funding and under funding competition.
Yet, given such regulation, funding competition in the higher education sector con-
tinues to be of questionable value. Funding competition still leads to an adversely
selected ICL-program which results in welfare losses, i.e., W RP/FCE < W RP/ICLE.
Thus, whether or not the government restricts access to higher education, each
13The dominance of the RP/FCE relative to the CME is not limited to the welfare criterion in
(3) but holds more generally. In fact, towards the end of subsection 4.2 we noticed that at the
interim stage the RP/FCE dominates the CME in the Pareto sense. This implies in particular
that ex ante expected utility of each agent is higher in the RP/FCE than in the CME.
19equilibrium with funding competition is dominated in social welfare terms by some
equilibrium without funding competition.
5 A Generalization
Our analysis so far has proceeded on the assumption that the social value of in-
vestment in human capital equals the private return on education; i.e., we have
abstracted from possible higher education externalities on productivity growth.
While these externalities are diﬃcult to measure they are believed to be signiﬁ-
cant (Creedy, 1995; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Englebrecht, 2003). Our model
can be generalized to include higher education externalities by assuming that the
basic productivity level A depends on aggregate human capital in the economy, H.
In this generalized setting, the human capital of agent i who has received signal yi
is given by (1), where A is replaced with A(H).14
Assumption 3 The basic human capital level of unskilled workers, A(H), is an
increasing function of the aggregate human capital, H, and satisﬁes 0 < A′(H) < 1,
∀H > 0.
As the externality in Assumption 3 makes investment in higher education so-
cially more valuable, an obvious implication is that underinvestment in the CME
becomes more severe while the extent of overinvestment in the ICLE and FCE de-
clines. Apart from this, all results in sections 3 and 4 which compare the levels of
social welfare across the various funding structures (see Table 1) remain valid. This
claim is easily veriﬁed for propositions 4 and 6, because the equilibria compared
in each of these propositions exhibit the same stocks of aggregate human capital,
H, and, hence, the same individual basic human capital level, A(H). The proofs
therefore remain valid with minor notational modiﬁcation.
As to propositions 5 and 7, observe that social welfare, W, is an increasing
function of individual basic human capital, A, in the FCE and in the RP/FCE.
14This formulation implies that all individuals (skilled and unskilled) beneﬁt from the externa-
lity. Some authors argue that the external eﬀect should be conﬁned to agents who invest in higher
education: bright students generate positive externalities for other students and for teachers but
not for unskilled workers (Gary-Bobo and Trannoy, 2008).
20This is true because in both equilibria the set of individuals who invest in higher
education is ﬁxed, i.e., independent of A,15 and therefore an increase in A raises
average consumption in each signal group. Now, due to the higher education exter-
nality, individual basic human capital in the RP/FCE and (under condition (15)) in
the FCE exceed the corresponding level in the CME. Therefore, the social welfare
assessments in propositions 5 and 7 remain valid.
Proposition 8 Modifying the human capital formation function (1) to include edu-
cation externalities such that A(H) satisﬁes Assumption 3 does not aﬀect the results
obtained in propositions 1-7.
6 Policy Implications and Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that government intervention in the higher education sector
can be helpful in two ways. First, such intervention may mitigate imperfections in
the market for risk bearing which prevent risks on investment in higher education
from being pooled in diversiﬁed portfolios. In particular, pure credit market funding
does not allow individuals to pool their idiosyncratic ability risks which results in
aggregate underinvestment in higher education. One important task of the govern-
ment is therefore the organization of additional higher education ﬁnance by means
of an income-contingent loans program and its implementation. Such program redu-
ces the risks on investments in human capital through pooling, thereby improving
the risk allocation in the economy and enhancing accumulation of human capital.
Second, a funding structure for investment in higher education under which an
income-contingent loans program competes against credit markets has two conside-
rable drawbacks which call for further government intervention. On the one hand,
such funding structure leads to aggegate overinvestment in human capital; on the
other hand, the competition between the ICL-program and credit market funding
creates an externality which leaves the ICL-program adversely selected thereby wor-
sening the terms of repayment for agents participating in the program. The ﬁrst
drawback can be eliminated, and the second drawback can be mitigated, by a policy
15In the FCE all individuals invest, and in the RP/FCE those individuals with signals larger
than ye invest. According to (6), ye is independent of A.
21which restricts access to higher education to individuals with suﬃciently promising
ability prospects. Under such regulation, the installation of an ICL-program which
competes against the credit market for higher education loans raises social welfare
in the economy. In order to be eﬀective, government intervention must therefore
combine the provision of income-contingent education loans with access restrictions
to higher education.
The incentive mechanisms involved when funding systems compete in higher
education are relevant in other areas of economic policy as well. In many countries,
for instance, health insurance is provided by a public insurance agency as well as
by private insurance companies. The public insurance agency pools health risks
across the entire population of insurees while the private insurance companies pool
health risks only across individuals in the same signal group, i.e., with similar health
reports. The competition between these insurance schemes gives rise to similar
mechanisms of risk pooling and adverse selction as those studied here for the higher
education sector.
Appendix
In this Appendix we prove Lemma 1 and propositions 2,4,5,7 in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1: By MLRP, the term in (14) is strictly increasing in y, if
ρ(a) := u(c1(a)) − u(c2(a,y
∗))
is strictly increasing in a, where
c1(a) := Aw + aw − R; c2(a,y



















The RHS of the above equality is trivially positive if c2(a,y∗) ≥ c1(a). Let us


















22This expression is positive because c1(a) > c2(a,y∗) and cu′(c) is increasing in c by
Assumption 2.
Proof of Proposition 2: We need to show that ∂W(y∗)/∂y∗ > 0. Deﬁne
c(y,y






c(y) := Aw + ¯ ay − R
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The last inequality follows from the concavity of v(·).
23Proof of Proposition 4: Recall that in both equilibria all individuals invest in















Expected consumption of individuals in signal group y is
¯ c
ICLE
















; if y < y∗
w(A + ¯ ay) − R ; if y ≥ y∗ (23)
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(≥)
< ¯ a. (24)
(22) and (24) together imply that ¯ cFCE


























Thus, the ICLE dominates the FCE in welfare terms.
Proof of Proposition 5: We prove the proposition by showing that ¯ cCME
˜ y is a
mean decreasing spread of ¯ cFCE
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w(A + ¯ ay) − R ; if y ≥ ˆ y
(25)










< ˆ y, (26)
24i.e., consumption is more dispersed across signal groups in the CME than in the













= (w¯ a − R) −
  ¯ y
ˆ y
(w¯ ay − R)ν(y)dy ≥ 0. (27)
Thus, aggregate consumption is higher in the FCE than in the CME. (26) and (27)
together imply that ¯ cCME
˜ y is a mean decreasing spread of ¯ cFCE
˜ y .
Proof of Proposition 7: We prove the proposition by showing that ¯ cCME
˜ y is a
mean-decreasing spread of ¯ c
RP/FCE
˜ y .














Average consumption in signal group y is given by (25) in the CME and by (19) in
the RP/FCE. Since ¯ ay† > ¯ a(ye,y†) and ¯ c
RP/FCE
y is ﬂatter than ¯ cCME
y for y ∈ (ˆ y,y†),







˜ y , if y
(≥)
≤ ˘ y. (29)
In view of (28) and (29), ¯ cCME





Income-continguent loans Funding competition Credit market
Unrestr. participation W ICLE > W FCE [under restriction (15)]
> W CME
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